Create products that are not massturbate

One of the most versatile of the advice we give at Y Combinator is to take up challenging work. Many start-up founders believe that startups or "fly" or not. You create something, make it available, and if you come up with the best mousetrap, people, as promised, they will come to you. Or not, in this case, you have no market. [1]

Actually startups take off because the founders make them take off. There are only a small number of startups that grew themselves, usually because their excitation requires some effort. Here you can make a comparison with a crank handle, which was completed the cars before the advent of electric starters. If the engine wound up, it worked, but the launch was a separate and laborious process.

customer engagement


The most common a difficult job, for which the founders should be taken at the start, it is an independent user engagement. It should deal with almost all start-UPS. You don't wait for users to come to you. You have to go and fetch them.

Stripe is one of the most successful startups that we've funded, and the problem they decided was urgent. If anyone was to sit and wait for customers in this Stripe. However, in the framework of Y Combinator this project is known for its aggressive user acquisition at an early stage.

Startups are creating something for other startups have a big pool of potential customers of other companies that we Finance, and nobody used it better than Stripe. At Y Combinator we invented a method called "installing Collishaw". More timid, the founders asked: "do you want to try our beta?" and if Yes say, "Great, we'll send you the link". But the brothers Collison to wait was not going to. As soon as anyone agreed to try Stripe, they said, "okay, now give me your laptop" and immediately made the installation.

There are two reasons why the founders refused to go to the people and to attract users individually. The first is a combination of shyness and laziness. Better to sit at home writing code than go out and talk to a bunch of strangers and likely to get rejected from most of them. However, for the success of a startup, at least one founder (usually the Executive Director) needs to spend a lot of time on sales and marketing. [2]

The second reason founders ignore this path is that specific numbers seem too small. Large well-known startups didn't start, I think they are. And make the mistake of underestimating the strength of aggregate growth. We ask every startup to measure progress weekly growth. If you have 100 users, you need to get 10 more next week to a growth rate of 10% per week. And even if 110 do not seem much better than 100, supporting growth at around 10% per week, you will be amazed at how large the numbers will eventually get. In a year you will have 14000 users, and two – 2 million.

You act completely different when you get people by the thousands, and the growth rate will gradually slow down. But if there is a market, then usually you can start to attract users manually and then gradually switch to automated methods. [3]

Airbnb is a classic example of this method. The market is so difficult to break the deadlock, first you need to be ready for heroic deeds. In the case of Airbnb that was walking home in new York, recruiting new users and help existing ones. I remember Airbnb during Y Combinator: forever with the bags on wheels because dinners on Tuesdays they always from somewhere flew.

Understanding the fragility of a startup


Airbnb now seems like a force that cannot be stopped, however, at the beginning of the project was so fragile that his success or failure depended on the about 30 days of walking the flats with the aim of individual to attract users.

The initial fragility was inherent not only to Airbnb. Almost all startups are fragile initially. And this is one of the main things inexperienced founders and investors (and reporters and know-it-alls on the forums) misinterpreted, unconsciously evaluating startups in its infancy by the standards of the already established startups. It would be like to look at a newborn and say, "This tiny creature will never be able to achieve anything".

It's okay if reporters and know-it-alls don't believe in your startup. They are always all wrong. Also normally, if investors do not believe in your startup, they will change their minds when they see your growth. Most dangerous, if you do not believe in your startup. I often have to encourage founders who do not see the full potential of what we create. Even bill gates made that mistake. He returned to Harvard for the fall semester after the founding of Microsoft. And although he remained there a while, would never go back if I knew that Microsoft would become an even share of what he has become. [4]

At an early stage of a startup should ask is not "will Win the company the world?" and "How large may be the company, if the founders do it right?". But the right steps can simultaneously seem time-consuming and illogical. Microsoft is not very impressive when it was just a couple guys in Albuquerque, who wrote Basic interpreters for a market of several thousand "hobbysts ' mailers" (as they were then called), however, if you look back, it was the best way, which allowed the company to dominate the software market for personal computers. And I know Brian chesky and Joe Gebbia (the founders of Airbnb) did not think that they are on the path to great success when doing "professional" pictures of the first surrendering apartments. They were just trying to survive. But, as time has shown, it was also the right path, which allowed us to dominate the huge market.

How to find users for engaging manually? If you create something that solve your own problem, then you only need to look like themselves, that is usually quite simple. In other cases, it is necessary to make a more conscious effort to find the most promising flow of users. You can usually get the first group of users, making a comparatively untargeted launch, and then to see who will show more enthusiasm and to look like them. For example, Ben Silbermann noticed that a lot of the first Pinterest users were interested in design, so to attract users, he attended a conference of bloggers who write about design, and it worked out great. [5]

fun for the user


Everything possible must be done not only in order to obtain users, but also to make them feel happy. Wufoo, for example, sent each new user a hand written letter of thanks as much time as he could (turned out to be surprisingly long). Your first users should feel that by signing you have made the right choice. And you in turn must find new ways to please them.

Why we have to teach startups this? Why founders don't understand it themselves? I think, for three reasons.

First, many startup founders are trained as developers and work with clients in such training is not included. You are expected to develop something reliable, and not Rublevskoe attention to each user as a sales Manager. Oddly enough, the development is opposed to mentoring, and this tradition arose at a time when developers were less influential and were only at the head of his narrow area of development, and did not command the parade. You can be stubborn, if you Scotty, but not kirk.
The second reason why the founders do not pay enough attention to the individual clients, it fears that such tactics will not work. When the startups in its infancy, expresses such a concern, I explain that in the current state they have nothing to lose. Maybe if they make a special effort to make existing users superscientifiku, one day users will be so many that they will not be able to continue to do so. It would be great to encounter such a problem. And when that happens, you will understand that pleasing users is easier than it seemed. Partly because you can usually find easier ways than originally intended, and partly because the desire to delight users by that time will firmly enter in your culture.

I've never seen a startup which would have stalled due to the fact that too busy trying to bring happiness to its first users.

But the main reason why the founders do not realize how sensitive they could be to their users is probably that they themselves have never experienced such attention. Their standards of work with clients was influenced by the companies whose customers they are, and it's mostly large companies. Tim cook doesn't send you a hand written thank you for your purchase of the laptop. He can't. And you can! This is one of the advantages of a small company: you can provide the level of service which not under force to provide any company. [6]

Once you understand that user experience is not limited to existing traditions, is to think about how far you can go, trying to please their users.

user Experience


I was trying to think of a phrase that would be passed, as excessive should be a focus on the user, and realized that it was already made Steve jobs: it must be insanely great (insanely great). Steve used the word "crazy" not as a synonym for "very". He literally meant that you need to focus on quality of execution to such a degree that in everyday life would be considered pathological.

With all the most successful startups we funded, it was, and it's probably not surprising potential founders. The founders of the newcomers do not understand is what makes the pursuit of "insanely great" embryonic startup. When Steve jobs started using that expression, Apple was already held by the company. Steve was referring to the Mac (including its documentation and even packaging – such is the nature of obsession), which was supposed to be insanely great in terms of concept and execution. Developers it is easy to understand. This is just a more uncompromising version of the reliable and wonderful product.

To the founders it is difficult to understand (maybe Steve himself was hard to understand), which gives "insanely great" in the first few months of life of a startup. Not the product must be insanely great, and user-experience of your users. For a large company the product is the dominant component. But you can and should ensure users an insanely great experience with an early, unfinished and imperfect product, compensating for flaws.

Perhaps it can be done and is it necessary? Yes. Excessive attention to first users – not just a valid method of stimulation of growth. For most successful startups is an essential part of the relationship necessary to obtain a good product. Build a better mouse trap (trap for customers) is not indivisible operation. Even if you start like most successful start-UPS and create what you need yourself, your first product will never be quite right. Apart from areas where mistakes are too many, it is often better not to be tuned to perfection from the very beginning. This is especially true of software: it is usually best to represent the product as soon as it will have some usefulness, and then see what they do with him. Perfectionism is often an excuse for procrastination in any case, the first model of users is always inaccurate even if the identified one of them. [7]
The feedback you receive, communicating directly with the first users will be the most useful. Becoming a big company, you are forced to use focus groups and to regret that I couldn't get to their users at home or at work and see how they use your product as you did when those users were very few.

Curb flame


Sometimes the right thing is to focus on a very narrow market. It is like kindling a fire: first you build a small fire and let it ignite, and then add more wood.

This was the case with Facebook. At first it was only meant for Harvard students. In the form of its potential market was only a few thousand people, but because the resource really meet their needs, created critical mass. Then for a while to Harvard was added to certain colleges. When I spoke to mark Zuckerberg at School for startups, he noted that the compilation of a list of courses for each College was laborious work, but thanks to him, students feel as at home.

Any startup that could be described as a market, typically starts in any market segment, but it can work for other startups. You should always think about whether there is a market segment where you can quickly gain a critical mass of users. [8]

Most startups that use strategy to contain the flames, doing it unconsciously. They create something for themselves and their friends, who become the first clients, and only later you realize that you can offer your product a broader market. The strategy works well in its unconscious application. However, the greatest danger of the unconscious use of this model is the naive denial of its parts. For example, if you create something for yourself and your friends, or even if create, but came from the corporate world, and your friends are not your first clients, you no longer have a perfect initial market on a silver platter.

Among companies the best first customers are usually other startups. They are more open-minded by nature and only having started, have not had time to make a choice on all counts. Plus, if they are successful and begin to grow quickly, you will grow with them. One of the many unintended benefits of the Y Combinator (and especially the Y Combinator) is that B2B startups now have at hand an instant market of hundreds of other startups.

Path Meraki


Startups hardware can act like Meraki. And although we didn't Fund Meraki, the founders were graduates of Robert Morris, so we know their history. They started with a really complicated: they collected their routers.

Hardware startups face an obstacle that is not in the way of software projects. Minimum order value for shipment to the factory is usually a few hundred thousand dollars. This can drive you into a catch-22: without a product, it is impossible to provide the growth needed to raise funds for the production of the product. Previously, when hardware startups had to rely on investors ' money, you had to be very persuasive to overcome this obstacle. The emergence of crowdfunding (or more precisely pre-orders) very helpful. But anyway, I advise startups to do as Meraki. Did Pebble. They collect the first few hundred hours alone. If it were not for this stage, they probably wouldn't sell hours for 10 million dollars on Kickstarter.

As excessive attention to the first customers, independent production turns out to be valuable for hardware startups. You can quickly change the design and you will learn what otherwise would not be able to find out. Eric Migicovsky from Pebble said that among the things he learned was "how important it is to have good screws." Who would have thought?

Consulting


Sometimes we advise founders of B2B startups to bring customer focus to the extreme: to select a single user and act as if they're consultants, creating something for him alone. The first user serves as the form for casting, continue to adjust until you are perfectly fit his needs, so you can usually get something that wants to take advantage of other users. Even if they will not much, probably there are adjacent markets where you can find more. If you can find one user who really needs something, and will work to address this need, you will be working on what people need, that is what is supposed to do a startup. [9]

Business is a typical example of a complex work. It (and other ways) safely until you get money for it. It is here that the company crossed the line. While you are a grocery company that is just overly attentive to the customer, they appreciate it even if you don't solve all their problems. But as soon as this attentiveness you start paying, you expect that you will do everything.

One such method of attracting business initially reluctant users is to use their own ON their behalf. We did at Viaweb. When we talked with the sellers and asked if they would like to use our software to create online stores, some answered that I would not like, but allowed us to create online stores for them. As we were ready to do anything to get users we did. We felt pretty bad at the time. Instead of organizing big strategic partnerships in the field of e-Commerce we tried to sell the bags, pens and mens shirts. We now understand that this was the right class, because we knew what would feel sellers using our software. Sometimes the feedback was almost instantaneous: by creating a website of any store, I understood that the necessary function, which we have, so I spent a few hours on its implementation and continued to build the website.

manually


There is a more extreme option, when you don't just use their software and do work in quality. With only a small number of users, sometimes you can do manually that you plan to automate later. This allows you to run faster, and when you eventually will automate the process, you'll know exactly what to do, because the completion of these actions will provide you with muscle memory.

When manual components appear to the user software, it begins to resemble a cruel joke. For example, when the Stripe handing out "instant" accounts to its first users, the founders just manually secretly recorded regular accounts.

Some startups at the initial stage can be fully manual. You can find someone who are faced with the problem that needs solving, solve this problem manually and continue to do so for as long as possible, gradually automating bottlenecks. You can be a little scary that user problems are solved not yet automated, but this is not as scary as the more common presence of automatic features that does not solve anyone's problems.

the Rejection of high-profile launches


It should be noted one initial tactic that usually doesn't work: the high-profile launch. I occasionally meet founders who believe that startups represent unguided missiles, not manned aircraft, and that success can only be achieved if the launch will be made with sufficient initial velocity. They want to publish immediately in 8 different editions. And to start, of course, on Tuesday, because they read somewhere that this is the best day to start.
To understand how mean little runs, very simple. Think of any successful startups. How many of their launches do you remember? All what is needed to run a certain initial user base. How well things go in a few months, depends on how happy you will make those users and how many of them were. [10]

So why did the founders think the start-up of matter? This combination of selfishness and laziness. They think that what they create is so great that everyone who hears about it will immediately sign up. In addition, the work will be substantially less if you can get users just declaring its existence, and without drawing each one separately. Even if you do create something great, getting users will always be a gradual process partly because great is usually still new, but mainly because users have to think about anything except your product.

Partnerships usually don't work. They do not work for startups in General, but especially not work if they are used to stimulate growth. A common mistake inexperienced founders – the belief that partnership with a large company, will provide a major breakthrough. After six months they all say the same thing: the work was much more than we expected, but in the end we have almost nothing received. [11]

It is not enough just to create something extraordinary from the beginning. From the very beginning you need to make extraordinary efforts. Any strategy that does not involve effort – waiting for the loud startup to get users or a big partner – suspicious because of the fact.

Vector approach


The need to do something frighteningly time-consuming at the beginning, almost universal, therefore, perhaps we should stop to consider startup ideas as scalars. Instead, you should try to consider them as a combination of what you are going to create, and hard work, you are going to do to make the company work.

This approach to ideas startups can be interesting because now that there are two components, you can try to be creative as to the second and the first. However, in most cases the second component will be what it usually is: a hand attract users and provide them with an unusually pleasant experience. The main advantage of the vector approach to startups is a reminder to founders that they should work hard in two directions. [12]

In the best case, both components of the vector will be a valuable contribution in the DNA of your company: a hard work which you must do at the start, this is not a necessary evil, and irreversible change for the better. If you have aggressive to attract users, while you are still small, probably becoming a major, you will cease to be aggressive. If you have to produce your own hardware or use their software on behalf of users, you learn what in another situation would not have been able to learn. And most importantly, if you have to work hard to delight users when you have them quite a bit, you will continue to do so when their number becomes large.

notes


[1] In fact, Emerson was never specifically mentioned mousetraps. He wrote: "If a man has good corn, wood, boards, or pigs to sell or he can make chairs, knives, boilers or Church bodies better than anyone else his house will lead a broad trodden road, even if this house is in the woods." Back

[2] Thanks to Sam Altman for the advice, I'll say so. No, you can't avoid lessons, sales, hiring someone who will do it for you. First you must deal with the sales. You can later hire a real sales Manager that will replace you. Back
[3] This works because as you grow, your size helps you grow. Patrick Collison wrote "At some point there was a very noticeable change in self Stripe. He ceased to be the rock which we had to push, and was the car which moves by inertia." Back

[4] One of the more clever ways that Y Combinator can help founders, is the adjustment of ambition, because we know exactly how to look many successful startups. Back

[5] If you create something, why can not gather a small group of users, which can observe (e.g., corporate SOFTWARE), and in the area where you have no connections, you will have to rely on cold calls and recommendations. But whether it is necessary to take up such an idea? Back

[6] Garry Tan pointed out an interesting trap, into which the founders at the start. They want to seem so large that even mimic the flaws of big companies, like indifference to individual users. It seems to them a more "professional". In fact, it is better to accept the fact that you are small and use all the advantages of this situation. Back

[7] Your user model almost never can be perfectly accurate, because users needs often change in response to what you create for them. Create for them a computer and they suddenly want to work on it with spreadsheets, because thanks to the advent of your computer, someone invented the spreadsheet. Back

[8] If you need to choose between the group that signs up the fastest, and a group that will pay more, it is usually better to choose first, because likely these people will become your first customers. They might affect your product, and you don't have to spend so much effort on sales. They have less money, but you don't need much to maintain your target growth rate early on. Back

[9] Yes, I can imagine cases where you might end up working on something that in reality only needed one user. But it is usually obvious even to inexperienced founders. Therefore, if it's not obvious, creating something for the market of a single user, don't worry about it. Back

[10] May even be an inverse relationship between the grandeur of the launching and success. The only launches I remember is the famous failures, like the Segway and Google Wave. Wave is a particularly alarming example because I think initially the idea was great, but partly killed her too bloated to run. Back

[11] Google rose amid Yahoo, but it was not a partnership. Yahoo was their client. Back

[12] It will also remind founders that an idea where the second component is empty (the idea where you can't do anything to make it work, because I don't know how to find users who can be called manually) is probably a bad idea, at least for those founders. Back

Thanks to Sam Altman, Semi Buchheit, Patrick Collison, Kevin Hale, Steven levy, Jessica Livingston, Geoff the Ralston and Garry Tan for reading drafts of this article.


*** the title of the article in the original sounds like — Do Things that Don't Scale. There is a certain play on words: on the one hand, scale — zoom (project); on the other, unscalable — it is inaccessible, difficult. The first value is the most familiar and generally accepted, but in fact is a provocation. The second reflects the essence of the article. In General, do not succumb to provocation))

The translation is done in the framework of the summer school start-UPS Tolstoy Summer Camp and MetaBeta.
Article based on information from habrahabr.ru

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